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Abstract: Cybersecurity has become a significant concern in corporate and 
commercial settings, and for good reason: a threatened or realized cybersecurity 
breach can materially affect firm value for capital investors.  This paper explores 
whether market arbitrageurs appear systematically to exploit advance knowledge of 
such vulnerabilities.  We make use of a novel data set tracking cybersecurity breach 
announcements among public companies to study trading patterns in the derivatives 
market preceding the announcement of a breach.  Using a matched sample of 
unaffected control firms, we find significant trading abnormalities for hacked targets, 
measured in terms of both open interest and volume.  Our results are robust to 
several alternative matching techniques, as well as to both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal identification strategies.  All told, our findings appear strongly 
consistent with the proposition that arbitrageurs can and do obtain early notice of 
impending breach disclosures, and that they are able to profit from such information. 
Normatively, we argue that the efficiency implications of cybersecurity trading are 
distinct—and generally more concerning—than those posed by garden-variety 
information trading within securities markets. Notwithstanding these idiosyncratic 
concerns, however, both securities fraud and computer fraud in their current form 
appear poorly adapted to address such concerns, and both would require nontrivial 
re-imagining to meet the challenge (even approximately).  
 
  
                                                        
*
 We thank Jack Coffee, Jeff Gordon, Alexander Guembel, Laurie Hodrick, Colleen Honigsberg, Gur 
Huberman, Mark Lemley, Jusin McCrary, Mitch Polinsky, Fernan Restrepo, and workshop 
participants at Columbia Law School, the Santa Fe Institute, Stanford Law School, the Toulouse 
School of Economics, and the University of Toronto for helpful comments and discussions. Kailey 
Flanagan and Hanna K. Song provided excellent research assistance. This draft is a companion piece 
to an eponymous technical manuscript offering a more detailed theoretical analysis. All errors, 
regrettably, are ours.  
†
 First Version: December 2, 2017. © 2018 by Joshua Mitts and Eric Talley. For the most recent 
version of this paper, please visit https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107123. 
MAR. 2018 INFORMED TRADING AND CYBERSECURITY BREACHES  
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMED TRADING AND CYBERSECURITY BREACHES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INFORMED CYBER-TRADING ................................... 6 
DATA SOURCES ............................................................................................................................................ 6 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 13 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 18 
3. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: IS CYBER-TRADING SPECIAL? ....................... 23 
PRICE DISCOVERY .................................................................................................................................... 24 
DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS .................................................................................................................. 25 
MARKET LIQUIDITY ................................................................................................................................. 26 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................................................... 27 
4. PRESCRIPTIVE CHALLENGES ........................................................................................ 28 
SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY ............................................................................................................. 33 
LIABILITY UNDER THE CFAA .............................................................................................................. 42 
SYNOPSIS ..................................................................................................................................................... 45 
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 47 
 
 
 
 
MAR. 2018  INFORMED TRADING AND CYBERSECURITY BREACHES   
 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
The ascendancy and impact of the information economy during the last 
quarter century have been dramatic and unprecedented.  Fully one fifth of the 
preeminent Dow Jones Industrial Index in the mid-1990s was composed of Eastman 
Kodak, Bethlehem Steel, F.W. Woolworth, International Paper, Sears Roebuck and 
Union Carbide. Amazon and Google were little-known startups. Apple Computer—
which didn’t make this cut—was a moribund upstart from the 1980s; Facebook and 
Bitcoin were still a decade away from inception.  How times have ever changed.  
The digitization of the world's economy has hastened profound changes in 
commerce, record-keeping, law enforcement, personnel policy, banking, insurance, 
securities markets, and virtually all aspects of services and manufacturing sectors.   
And yet, a key pillar of the digital economy—the ease of accessing/copying/ 
distributing information at scale—is also frequently its Achilles Heel, in the form of 
cybersecurity risk.  The massive and cataclysmic data breach of Equifax in 
September 2017, for example, which compromised highly confidential information 
of tens of millions of clients (including Social Security numbers), was hardly the first 
of its kind—nor will it be the last.  For more than a decade, firms and organizations 
that store confidential data digitally have been targets (potential or actual) of similar 
types of attacks often with analogously cataclysmic implications for victims.   
Within securities-market settings, of course, one person’s catastrophe can be 
another’s arbitrage opportunity.  And so it came to be in the late summer of 2016, 
when Muddy Waters Capital—a well-known short hedge fund—opened a 
confidential line of communication with MedSec, a start-up cybersecurity firm 
claiming to have discovered a serious security software flaw in the pacemakers 
produced by St. Jude Medical, a then-public medical device company (knee-deep in 
the process of being acquired by Abbot Laboratories). Only after taking a substantial 
short position in St. Jude did Muddy Waters publicly disclose the device’s 
vulnerability,
1
 causing an immediate fall in St. Jude's stock price in excess of eight 
percent.
2
 Similar patterns of material changes in value after disclosure of a 
cybersecurity event are now commonplace.
3
 
Muddy Waters' securities-market play around St. Jude’s data breach 
disclosure is perhaps unsurprising—particularly when (a) cybersecurity breaches can 
have material price effects in capital markets; and (b) the underlying vulnerability 
                                                        
1
 See http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/stj/mw-is-short-stj/ (August 2015). 
2
 See Goldstein, Matthew, Stevenson, Alexandra and Picker, Leslie, 2016. “Unusual Pairing Makes 
Public Bet vs. Pacemakers.” New York Times (Sept. 8, 2016 at B1). 
3
 To take a current example, Uber's recent disclosure of a cybersecurity loss of client payment records 
caused an outside investor (Softbank) to reduce its valuation assessment of Uber by nearly a third.  
See Financial Times, "SoftBank share purchase discounts Uber by 30%" (Nov. 27, 2017). 
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involved potentially confidential data.  Trading in the securities of compromised 
issuers is, after all, far safer than trafficking directly in the stolen information itself.
 
Indeed, fencing such protected data directly is almost always a criminal offence 
under state and federal law.
 4
 In contrast, buying low and selling high (or selling high 
and buying low) in securities markets is a venerated capitalist ritual.  At the same 
time, the St. Jude / Muddy Waters kerfuffle raises intriguing questions about how 
widespread such cybersecurity-related trading is, whether material arbitrage rents are 
available, and who tends to earn them. And, to the extent that appreciable arbitrage 
rents exist, might they directly or indirectly subsidize cyber-hacking---effectively 
catalyzing destructive activity solely for the purpose of trading on the basis of the 
harms and risks it creates?  Is it possible to detect such activities by observing the 
footprint of trading patterns? Should such coordinated behavior be more heavily 
regulated by authorities? 
In this paper, we consider public-company announcements of cybersecurity 
breaches, analyzing how they interact with securities-market trading activity.  
Specifically, we consider the phenomenon of securities-market trading on the basis 
of advanced knowledge of a cybersecurity breach (“informed cyber-trading”). 
Conceptually, such information arbitrage opportunities are eminently plausible, and 
privately informed traders can typically exploit their information so long as there is 
sufficient independent market activity (e.g., among liquidity or noise traders) to 
provide “cover” for the informed arbitrageur. Thus, informed traders plausibly have 
a strong incentive to take short positions against the hacked firms—positions that 
should be observable in securities market activity.  We test this proposition 
empirically, making use of a novel data set corporate data breaches involving 
publicly traded companies. Using a variety of means to match breached firms against 
comparators with no announced vulnerabilities, we find significant trading 
abnormalities in the put option market for hacked firms, measured both through open 
interest and trading volume.  Our results, moreover, appear robust to a variety of 
matching techniques as well as to cross-sectional and time-series analysis.  We view 
these results as consistent with the proposition that arbitrageurs tend to have early 
notice of impending cybersecurity breach disclosures, and that they trade on the basis 
of that information. 
Although our principal focus is positive and empirical in nature, our findings 
also hold relevance for larger normative / prescriptive debates about whether such 
trading practices warrant additional legal proscription.  Normatively, the debate over 
how (or whether) securities law should regulate informed trading is complex, 
balancing concerns over price discovery, liquidity, and allocative efficiency.  
Informed cyber-trading shares many of these traits; but it also tees up other 
efficiency concerns that are contextually unique. If significant arbitrage rents from 
advance knowledge of cybersecurity risks were wholly undeterred, several 
                                                        
4
 See, e.g., 18 U.S. Code §§ 1028A and 1030 (discussed infra in Section 4). 
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inefficient investment distortions plausibly follow, both by “hackers” (including 
cybersecurity firms) attempting to expose vulnerabilities and introduce costs that 
would not otherwise come to light; and by issuers themselves, anxious to expend 
efforts to frustrate (or divert) hackers’ attention.  Moreover, the profits obtained via 
these trading opportunities may enhance hackers’ incentives to exploit security 
vulnerabilities, leading to greater dissemination of stolen personal information, 
impersonation and identity theft.  These represent real economic costs not present in 
garden variety information-trading contexts.  Consequently, informed cyber-trading 
plausibly justifies enhanced legal scrutiny of those who profit from the activity. 
Nevertheless, several variations of informed cyber-trading appear to perfectly 
legal under current practices. To be sure, it is almost certainly unlawful for an agent 
or fiduciary to trade on a firm’s material non-public information, or for third parties 
to conspire to steal such information, or for a person to spread false information 
about a cybersecurity risk in order to manipulate stock prices.
 
That said, if third 
parties were simply to use computer queries to access, discover, trade upon, and then 
expose bona fide cybersecurity vulnerabilities (as Muddy Waters and MedSec were 
alleged to have done), they would face little scrutiny under current law.  They would 
not violate market manipulation proscriptions, which require the introduction of 
inaccurate information into the market.
5
  Nor would they appear to run afoul of 
received insider trading theories, which still require the breach of a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship (though courts are actively revisiting this requirement as of this 
writing).
6
 Perhaps the closer match on liability grounds would be the provisions of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which (notwithstanding its name) does 
not require a showing of intent to defraud in order to trigger liability. But the CFAA 
remains relatively untested in these contexts, and its remedies provisions are 
generally limited to concrete remediation costs.  In short, the task of redesigning law 
to address the costs of informed cyber-trading is a sizable ask, posing a difficult 
prospective challenge for policy makers and regulators alike. 
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on cyber-security threats in 
law, economics and computer science, assimilating to a larger literature on informed 
trading in securities markets. From a conceptual perspective, several contributions in 
                                                        
5
 See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
6
 U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642  (1997).  Several federal courts have recently contemplated an 
extension to insider trading doctrine to reach (so-called) “outsider traders”— informed traders who 
are neither corporate fiduciaries nor have breached a confidential relationship, but who use deceptive 
means to hack into another’s computer system. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2nd 
Cir. 2009) ("misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off 
limits, and then stealing that information is plainly deceptive within the ordinary meaning of the 
word…. [D]epending on how the hacker gained access, it…could be, by definition, a deceptive device 
or contrivance that is prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b--5.") Nevertheless, no court to our 
knowledge has firmly embraced this expansion to date. We discuss this nascent strand of case law 
(sometimes referred to as “outsider trading”) in Section 4, infra. 
6
 See, e.g., Gordon, Lawrence A., & Martin P. Loeb. ”The economics of information security 
investment.” ACM Trans. on Info. & Sys. Sec. (TISSEC) 5.4: 438-57 (2002) (reviewing literature). 
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computer science
7
 have developed frameworks for analyzing self-protection 
decisions among firms that are potential cybersecurity risks, arguing that firms that, 
in a world of scarce resources, firms may optimally “triage” their self-protection 
efforts based on a cost-benefit calculus. Such calculus can often give rise to 
collective action problems of either under- or over-investment in protection,
8
 when 
(say) interconnected firms within a network make individual decisions about 
security. Others in information sciences have analyzed the problem from the 
standpoint of timing,
9
 asking whether targets should invest pro-actively before an 
attack or reactively afterward. If reactive investment is possible to mitigate an 
existing attack (and the information of such an attack becomes known), it may well 
be optimal to under-invest in proactive technology and utilize such mitigation efforts 
once attacks are detected.  
Although we are unaware of significant market pricing literature on informed 
cyber-trading per se, the efficiency implications of informed trading has been richly 
explored using seminal frameworks from information economics which demonstrate 
how informed traders can simultaneously catalyze price discovery and impede to 
market depth and liquidity.
10
 Empirically, our analysis draws on a growing literature 
computer science identifying misconfiguration flags to predict vulnerability to 
hacking, as well as estimating latency periods for cybersecurity vulnerability 
breaches (of between one and twelve months before disclosure).
 11
 Finally, the sub-
strand of the literature closest to ours studies how stock prices react to the disclosure 
of cybersecurity breaches. One notable study in this area
12
  presents a meta-analysis 
of 37 papers containing 45 empirical studies of the effect of information-security 
                                                        
7
 See, e.g., Gordon, Lawrence A., and Martin P. Loeb. ”The economics of information security 
investment.” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 5.4 (2002): 438-457 
(reviewing literature). 
8
 See Lelarge, Marc. ”Coordination in network security games: a monotone comparative statics 
approach.” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 30.11 (2012): 2210-2219. 
Kunreuther, Howard, & Geoffrey Heal. ”Interdependent security.” J. Risk & Uncertainty 26.2-3 
(2003): 231-249. Making a similar point using a framework based on a terrorism scenario); 
Lakdawalla, Darius N. and Talley, Eric L., Optimal Liability for Terrorism (October 2006). NBER 
Working Paper No. w12578. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=935571 (similarly 
applying such arguments to terrorism scenarios, and arguing that overinvestment in strategic target 
hardening by potential victims may justify allowing attacked parties to lodge a cause of action against 
non-attacked entities for over-protection). 
9
 See Böhme, Rainer, and Tyler Moore. ”The “iterated weakest link” model of adaptive security 
investment.” Journal of Information Security 7.02 (2016): 81. 
10
 See Kyle, Albert S. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica 53:6 (1985), pp. 
1315-1335; Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, ”Information, trade and common knowledge”. J. Econ. 
Th. 26(1): 17–27 (1982); L.R. Glosten and P.R. Milgrom. “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” Journal of Financial Economics, 14:71–
100, 1985. 
11
 See Liu, Yang, et al. ”Cloudy with a Chance of Breach: Forecasting Cyber Security Incidents.” 
USENIX Security Symposium 2015. 
12
 See Spanos, Georgios, and Lefteris Angelis. ”The impact of information security events to the stock 
market: A systematic literature review.” Computers & Security 58 (2016): 216-229. Zhang, Jing, et 
al., ”On the Mismanagement and Maliciousness of Networks.” NDSS. 2014. 
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breaches on public-company stock prices from 2003 to 2015. The authors find that 
75.6% of the studies measure statistically significant stock-price reactions to the 
disclosure of cybersecurity breaches. 20 out of 25 studies find negative and 
significant stock-price reactions for victim firms, and none of these find significant 
positive reactions for victim firms. Several other studies have found positive and 
significant stock-price reactions for information security firms, plausibly reflecting 
the additional demand for their services in the wake of security breaches. And, 
consistent with our findings, at least one significant study finds evidence of pre-
announcement information leakages associated with cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
13
 
That said, we are unaware of any prior study measuring trading patterns in the 
months preceding the disclosure and the central legal implications of such patterns, 
as we explore here. 
An important caveat to our analysis warrants attention before proceeding. 
Although our empirical results are strongly consistent with the type of informed 
cyber-trading that occurred in the Muddy Waters / St. Jude episode, trading activity 
by other market participants could produce similar results. If, for example, 
employees or managers of the target firm discovered early evidence of a 
cybersecurity breach or a vulnerability, they might also attempt to profit from that 
information prior to disclosure, and their activity would similarly be observable in 
our data. Although many of the policy considerations highlighted earlier would apply 
to this type of trader too, existing law is already well equipped to deal with it – since 
insiders at the firm typically owe duties of “trust and confidence,” the breach of 
which will clearly trigger insider trading liability under current law. In many ways, 
in fact, it is the curiously distinct legal treatment accorded insiders and outsiders in 
this space that makes the topic an interesting one to ponder.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our core empirical 
analysis of informed cyber-trading.  Using a novel data set of publicly disclosed 
cybersecurity incidents, we demonstrate unusual activity in the put-option market in 
the weeks leading up to the disclosure, measured through “open interest” and trading 
volume.  Section 3 discusses the normative implications of our findings, arguing 
that—relative to garden-variety informed trading—cyber-trading plausibly deserves 
greater legal scrutiny under federal securities law. Section 4 delves further into 
whether current legal institutions are equipped to take on the added threats of 
informed cyber-trading.  Here we argue that contemporary securities fraud and 
computer fraud law appear, at least individually, unfit for the challenge, both 
suffering from distinct forms of under-inclusiveness. While long-term statutory 
reforms may provide a durable response, in the shorter term a more expedient elixir 
                                                        
13
 See Arcuri, Maria C., Marina Brogi, and Gino Gandolfi. ”The effect of information security 
breaches on stock returns: Is the cyber-crime a threat to firms?” Eur. Fin. Mgmt. Meeting, 2014 
(finding find that the mean cumulative abnormal return to 128 cybersecurity disclosures is -.029 in the 
(-20,+20) window, but shrinks to -0.003 in the (-1,1) window). 
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is likely to be maintaining the status quo, in which both doctrines play a supporting 
role in concert with expert regulators (such as the SEC), who should remain 
involved.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Empirical Evidence of Informed Cyber-Trading 
 In this section, we dispense with the long-winded lawyerly prologue,
14
 
cutting directly to the chase to (a) describe our approach for detecting informed 
trading in advance of cybersecurity breach announcements; and (b) report on our 
core empirical findings.
 
 
Data Sources 
Our analysis marshals a unique data set of announced corporate data breaches 
provided by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC). Since 2005, the ITRC has 
collected and published an annual list of data breaches “confirmed by various media 
sources and/or notification lists from state governmental agencies.” The ITRC's data 
breach report includes both exposure of personally identifying information—i.e., any 
incident “in which an individual name plus a Social Security number, driver's license 
number, medical record or financial record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially 
put at risk because of exposure”—as well as exposure of username and passwords 
that are not necessarily tied to an identifiable individual. One example of an ITRC 
data breach report—for a 2015 breach of Hyatt Hotels—is reproduced in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1: Specimen Identity Theft Resource Center Data Breach Report (Hyatt Hotels 2015). 
 
The categories of information included in the report are: (1) internal ITRC identifier 
of the breach, (2) the company which was attacked, (3) the state in which that 
company is located, (4) the date the breach was published, (5) the type of the breach, 
(6) the category of the breach, (7) whether personal records were exposed, (8) how 
many records were exposed, and (9) a textual description of the breach. In addition, 
the ITRC provides details on the source of information about the breach, e.g., a news 
media report or disclosure by (or through) a governmental agency.
15
 
                                                        
14
 Dispirited lawyerly types can nonetheless savor the opportunity to luxuriate in the palaverously 
doctrinal denouement comprising Section 4, infra. 
15
 State privacy laws often require companies to notify individuals whose personal information may 
have been compromised (see, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Â§ 359-C:19). Moreover, specific federal laws 
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The ITRC identified 4,580 data breaches from 2010 to 2016. While the vast 
majority of these incidents involve private companies, nonprofits and governmental 
actors, out of this group, we were able to match 145 breaches to publicly traded 
companies.
16
 To give a sense for the nature of the information contained in the 
textual descriptions of these 145 events, Figure 2 presents a bi-gram word cloud, 
which draws the most frequent consecutive word pairs in these descriptions with a 
size proportional to the term’s frequency --- i.e., larger words appear more frequently 
in the textual descriptions. As Figure 2 shows, the most popular terms in these 
descriptions reflect information that would typically be the subject of a data breach, 
i.e., personal information, email address, credit cards, addresses, social security 
numbers, etc. 
 
Figure 2: Bi-Gram Word Cloud for ITRC Data Breach Reports 
In order to conclude that transactions involving these victims of data breaches 
are not due to random chance alone, it is necessary to compare these data breaches to 
some sort of baseline (i.e., a “control” group). Even if there were no trading on 
corporate data breaches—for example, if we were to simply draw public companies 
and calendar dates at random—some firms would still experience unusually large (or 
small) trading activity for independent reasons. It is therefore necessary to establish a 
baseline group that can serve as a counterfactual, a comparison set that allows us to 
                                                                                                                                                             
sometimes require disclosure, e.g., when health concerns are implicated (HIPPA), or if the breach is 
sufficiently material to require disclosure by a publicly traded company under the securities laws. 
Although there is no general duty to disclose all material information under the securities laws, but 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities may fall into one of the enumerated categories of material event 
disclosure required under Form 8-K. 
16
 For reasons detailed below, we end up using a smaller sample to ensure adequate comparability 
between firms and industries. 
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claim that but for the hacker-trader activities, target firms and the baseline group are 
similar in all other relevant ways, at least on average. If but-for causation in this 
sense appears to hold, then we are justified in concluding that observed differences 
attributable (at least in part) to hacker trading or tipping. 
We examine two primary sources of data in order to measure possible hacker 
trading and tipping. First, we consider approximately at-the-money (ATM) equity 
put options written on the common stock of victim firms. An equity put option is 
effectively a downside bet on a firm's stock: it gives its holder the right (but not the 
obligation) to sell the firm’s stock at a specified price (the “strike price”) on a 
specific expiration date (also known as the “maturity” date for the option).  If one 
denotes the strike price of a put option as 𝐾, its maturity date as 𝑇, and the firm’s 
stock price on the maturity date as 𝑇 as 𝑆𝑇 , then the holder of a put option who acts 
to maximize her payoff will receive the greater of (𝐾 − 𝑆𝑇) or zero at the time of 
expiry.
17
 In other words, she receives the difference between the strike price and the 
stock price at maturity if the former exceeds the latter. If the stock price at maturity 
is higher than the strike price, she will rationally not exercise the put option because 
that would cost her money; she is better off doing nothing.
 18
  
Put options reflect a downside bet on the firm's stock because the value of a 
put option increases as the firm's stock price at maturity decreases. Put simply, the 
lower the stock price, the more the put option is worth: put options are thus 
directionally negative bets on the value of the firm. Because the directional 
implications of a data breach are unambiguously negative for a targeted firm --- that 
is, one would be hard-pressed to find an example of a successful data breach that 
should lead to an increase in the stock price of the victim firm --- put options are 
likely to become more valuable upon revelation of a successful data breach. This 
implies that market demand for put options may reflect at hackers or their “tippees” 
may seek to exploit information, known only to them, about a successful data breach. 
As noted above, we restrict our analysis to put options that are close to at the money 
--- that is, they have a delta between 0.4 and 0.6.
19
 Within this range, the strike price 
is likely to be relatively close to the current price of the firm's stock. We do so 
because a put option that is out of the money is likely to be less responsive to 
changes in the underlying price of the firm's stock. 
                                                        
17
 For example, suppose the stock’s market price at maturity is $5 and one holds a put option with 
strike price of $8. The holder can profit from this contract by (a) buying the stock at market price ($5) 
and then exercising the option, delivering the stock to the option counterparty (for $8) and pocketing 
the difference ($3).   
18
 The discussion in the text simplifies things a bit by presuming a “European” put option, which is 
exercisable only on expiration.  A similar (though slightly more complicated) analysis would attend 
an “American” option, which is exercisable on any date up to (and including) the maturity date.  
19
 The delta of a put option refers to the sensitivity of the put’s value to changes in the underlying 
stock price, or |𝜕𝑝𝑡/𝜕𝑆𝑡 |. 
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We measure market demand for put options in two ways. The first is open 
interest, which refers simply to the number of outstanding put-option contracts on the 
stock of a particular underlying firm. The second is volume, which refers to the 
quantity of put-option contracts that change hands between buyers and sellers over a 
particular window of time. Both measure the extent to which traders in the market 
are seeking to place downside bets on the prospects of victim firms. 
In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons that are straightforward to 
interpret, we aggregate our dataset to the firm-event level. That is, the unit of 
analysis in our study is an average measure of trading in a given firm's put options 
over a time window relative to a data breach event. For example, we refer below to 
average open interest of put options for a particular firm over the two months prior to 
disclosure of the data breach. If, hypothetically, there were two events and two firms 
for each event, there would be four observations, each reflecting the average open 
interest for each firm in the two months prior to each event. In the following 
subsection, we describe how we design our empirical study to maximize the 
reliability of inferences as to the link between corporate data breaches and the 
demand for put option. 
Empirical Design 
We wish to evaluate empirically whether there is heightened trading in put 
options prior to the announcement of corporate data breaches. To do so, we rely on 
the well-developed literature on causal inference in empirical economics. To be sure, 
our hypothesis is inherently descriptive in nature---we do not suppose that data 
breaches causally increase put option trading, but rather that individuals who are 
aware of data breaches prior to the rest of the market may be directly trading or 
tipping others as to the presence of these vulnerabilities prior to disclosure. Formally 
speaking, this thesis requires only a correlation between the execution of corporate 
data breaches and market demand for put options. 
Nonetheless, we are aware that an analysis of this sort is vulnerable to 
spurious correlations. The problem of forming a valid counterfactual—what level of 
put option trading would have emerged even in the absence of a data breach—is a 
vexing challenge that applies to our study just as much as with a classical causal 
inference project. For this reason, we employ methods to estimate the average 
treatment effect of data breaches, keeping in mind the importance of forming a valid 
counterfactual to evaluate whether observed put option demand can actually be 
attributed to data breaches. 
We thus estimate two basic kinds of empirical designs, each of which relies 
on a different dataset. The first is a cross-sectional estimation, which simply asks: is 
there a heightened level of open interest and trading volume in the put options of 
data breach targets, prior to revelation of the data breach by the victim firm? To 
minimize the likelihood that this simple comparison between firms for each event is 
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contaminated by other events that may give rise to put option trading, this estimation 
focuses on the two months immediately preceding announcement of the data breach. 
In this specification, we ask whether the average level of open interest and trading 
volume during this two-month is higher for firms who are the victims of data 
breaches. As described below, we employ propensity-score matching
20
 to ensure that 
treatment and control firms are as similar as possible. 
This cross-sectional specification, however, is vulnerable to the critique that 
firms may differ for unobserved reasons that can lead to greater overall demand for 
put options. To address this concern, we consider an alternative difference-in-
differences design, which allows each firm-event in our dataset to have a baseline 
level of open interest and trading volume of put options. In this difference-in-
differences specification, we compare the change in open interest and volume of put 
options from a baseline period --- eight to sixteen months prior to announcement of 
the data breach --- to the period of interest --- eight months prior to the day of 
announcement. 
In our difference-in-differences design, we use this eight-month cutoff for 
two reasons. First, this corresponds roughly to the average period of time during 
which a hacker is aware of a successful data breach.
21
 Moreover, a visual inspection 
of the data shows that this is also approximately the time when time trends begin to 
diverge between treatment and control firms---prior to this point, they are roughly 
parallel, as we show below. 
We aggregate pre-post differences to the firm-event level and compare these 
differences between treatment and control firms. As with the cross-sectional design, 
we employ propensity score matching on observable firm-level covariates, measured 
as of the year prior to the attack, to ensure that similar firms are compared to each 
other.  This heightens the plausibility of the counterfactual inference that treatment 
and control firms would have similar counterfactual outcomes. Along with showing 
that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied, this evidence suggests that observed 
differences in put option trading are likely to be linked to corporate data breaches 
and not spuriously arising as a result of other differences between firms. 
As noted previously, both of our specifications employ propensity-score 
matching,
22
 which matches each treatment observation to one or more control 
observations which are similar along several covariates. We generate a propensity 
score and thus matching observations by estimating a logistic regression on the 
following covariates: (1) 4-digit SIC industry code (i.e., an indicator for each), (2) 
log of market capitalization, (3) log of total assets, (4) log of net income, and (5) log 
                                                        
20
 See Abadie, A. and Imbens, G. W. (2006), Large sample properties of matching estimators for 
average treatment effects. Econometrica, 74(1):235–267. 
21
 Research by Symantec has shown that hackers tend to exploit security vulnerabilities for an average 
of ten months prior to discovery by the affected firm (Bilge and Dumitras, 2012). 
22
 See Abadie & Imbens, supra n. __ 
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of total liabilities. In our view, it is essential to compare within industry because 
firms in different industries are very different from each other. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Cross-Sectional Dataset 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Difference-in-Differences Dataset 
 
For these reasons, we are forced to drop those firms in industries which are too small 
to allow for obtaining a meaningful matched control group. Indeed, while many of 
these smaller industries contain several firms, many small-cap firms are too illiquid 
to have frequent options trading. Limiting the sample to those firms for which we 
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have sufficient information over the relevant time periods yields 46 treatment firm-
event pairs and 3,319 control firm-event pairs in the difference-in-differences dataset 
and 51 treatment firm-event pairs and 3,425 control firm-event pairs in the 
difference-in-differences dataset.
23
 Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on 
these datasets. 
The validity of our propensity-score matching method to estimate causal 
effects turns on the extent to which the treatment and control groups are balanced, 
that is, likely to exhibit the same counterfactual outcomes even in the absence of 
treatment. Of course, there are a relatively small number of public companies with 
liquid options in each 4-digit SIC code industry, so any matching procedure will fall 
short of achieving perfect balance. Nonetheless, we perform a series of tests to verify 
balance in the distribution of treatment and control firms. 
We begin by visually comparing the distribution of the propensity score for 
both the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference datasets when estimated using 
the full set of covariates. Figure 3 shows this distribution before and after matching 
for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference datasets, respectively.
24
 The 
similarity in the density of the two propensity scores suggests that the two groups are 
balanced on the propensity score. 
 
 
Figure 3: Propensity Score Balance Tests for Cross Sectional (Left Panel) and Difference-in-
Differences Data Sets (Right Panel). In both left and right panels, the density of propensity scores is 
plotted for treatment groups (solid lines) and control groups (dashed lines), comparing the raw 
controls with the propensity-score matched observations. 
Due to the relatively small number of public firms with liquid equity options 
in each SIC code, achieving greater balance on one covariate inevitably involves a 
loss of balance on another (to some extent). For this reason, in a later subsection, we 
present results using propensity-score matching on individual covariates, as well as 
all of the covariates together, to illustrate that the results do not depend on which 
                                                        
23
 The latter contains more firms than the former because it covers a longer time period. 
24
 In these figures, the propensity score is estimated on the subsample which contains nonzero open 
interest, but the results are virtually identical when estimating on the subsample that contains nonzero 
trading volume. 
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covariates are included. 
Table 3 compares covariate means in the cross-sectional and difference-in-
differences dataset between the raw and matched samples. While the matching is 
unable to achieve perfect balance across all of the covariates simultaneously, this 
table shows that each specification leads to near-perfect balance on a different 
covariate. As shown below, the consistency of the coefficient estimates across these 
different specifications in significance and magnitude strongly suggests that the 
results are not driven by spurious variation in covariate balance. 
Cross Sectional Matching 
 
Difference in Differences Matching 
 
Table 3: Balance Test on Individual Covariates for Cross Sectional (upper panel) and Difference-in-
Differences (lower panel) matched-sample specifications.  The raw mean in the largest possible 
subsample for each covariate is given in the first column. While the matching is unable to achieve 
perfect balance across all of the covariates simultaneously, this table shows that each specification 
leads to near-perfect balance on a different covariate. 
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We begin by estimating the average treatment effect (“ATE”) for the targeted 
firms by propensity score matching
25
 them with non-targeted comparators over a 
variety of economic indicia.  Normalizing the disclosure date to 0 for all breached 
firms, we compare (logged) open interest and (logged) volume of targeted firms to 
their matched counterparts over the interval [-60,0], corresponding to approximately 
the two-month period that precedes the first disclosure of the data breach.
26
 Here, our 
identification strategy is based on the assumption that this interval is likely to be 
unknown to anyone other than the hacker (and its tippees) and corporate officers who 
                                                        
25
 See Abadie & Imbens, supra n. __ 
26
 We show below that the results are not driven by the choice of this interval. 
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may have become aware of the data breach. First, we estimate the difference in log 
open interest on outstanding put options between treatment and control firms for a 
variety of matching covariates. The results are shown in the following Table:  
 
Table 4: Cross Sectional Estimation; Log Open Interest 
As the first row of Table 4 illustrates, there is an average increase of between .36 and 
.75 log points in the open interest of the put options written on target firms, and the 
result is consistent and statistically significant across specifications.   To get an 
intuition behind the economic significance of the coefficients reported above, recall 
from Table 1 that the mean log open interest was around 4.60. Thus, an open-interest 
coefficient estimate of 0.7 in the full model (see Column 4) corresponds to roughly 
0.70/4.60 = 15% of the mean logged open interest. 
Next, we estimate differences in log trading volume of outstanding put 
options between treatment and control firms. The results are shown in Table 5.  As 
the Table shows, there is an average increase of between .53 and 1.28 log points in 
trading volume of put options written on target firms. The result grows in both 
magnitude and significance as additional covariates are included in the propensity 
score matching, indicating that initial statistical insignificance may embody 
estimation noise driven by over-weighting of firms that are dissimilar. 
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Table 5: Cross Sectional Estimation; Log Volume 
 
As to the economic significance of these coefficients, recall from Table 1 that the 
mean log volume was 1.62. Thus, the point estimate of 1.28 in the full model 
corresponds to roughly 79% additional trading volume of put options in the targets of 
corporate data breaches relative to the control group.  All told, in addition to their 
statistical significance, our cross-sectional estimates for both open interest and 
volume appear to represent relatively large economic effects as well. 
Although Tables 4 and 5 already perform some robustness analysis as to our 
matching covariates, we also conducted a robustness check on our propensity score 
method. Specifically, we re-estimated the treatment effect with all covariates across 
three other matching schemes for identifying treatment effects: inverse-probability 
weighting,
27
 inverse-probability weighting with regression adjustment,
28
  and 
regression adjustment.
29
 The results are shown in the panels of the following Table, 
which demonstrates significant consistency across scoring methodologies. 
  
                                                        
27
 See Imbens, G. W. (2000). The role of the propensity score in estimating dose-response functions. 
Biometrika, 87(3):706–710. 
28
 See Wooldridge, J. M. (2007). Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing data 
problems. Journal of Econometrics, 141(2):1281–1301. 
29
 See Lane, P. W. and Nelder, J. A. (1982). Analysis of covariance and standardization as instances 
of prediction. Biometrics, pages 613–621. 
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Log Open Interest 
 
Log Volume 
 
 
Table 6: Alternative Matching Methods; Cross-Sectional Analysis; Log Open Interest (upper 
panel) and Log Volume (lower panel) 
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We also explored whether our results are an artifact of the two-month interval 
[-60,0], re-estimating the models matching on the full set of covariates using a 
variety of time event windows. The results for open interest and volume are shown in 
the following Table.  
Log Open Interest 
 
Log Volume 
 
Table 7: Alternative Time Horizons; Cross-Sectional Analysis; Log Open Interest (upper panel) 
and Log Volume (lower panel) 
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While it is clear from Table 7 that some subsamples yield higher t-statistics 
than others, the point estimates are consistent in sign and magnitude regardless of the 
time window. 
Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
One potential concern with the results in the prior Section is that no matter 
how careful we are in matching treatment with control firms, our treatment firms 
could still differ from our controls on some durable, unobserved dimension(s). To 
address this concern, we estimate a difference-in-differences specification which 
estimates a baseline level of open interest and volume on outstanding put options of 
target firms over the interval [-480, -240], i.e., approximately sixteen months to eight 
months prior to disclosure of the data breach.
30
 Our D-in-D design compares 
treatment-control differences during this baseline period to the analogous differences 
the interval [-240, 0], i.e., approximately eight months prior to disclosure up to the 
date of announcement. As explained previously, we aggregate the change in the log 
average open interest and log volume of put options between the two periods by 
firm-event, so there is one observation per firm-event. We then employ propensity 
score matching with robust standard errors to ensure that treatment and control firms 
are as balanced as possible on observable covariates and proceed to estimate the 
ATE on this outcome (i.e., the difference in log open interest and log volume). 
 
The key identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences analysis is that 
treatment and control firms follow parallel trends in the matched sample. We plot 
these parallel trends on log open interest in the following Figure: 
 
Figure 4: This figure plots time trends for log average open interest (left panel) and trading volume 
(right panel) on put options between treatment and control firms in the matched sample. The pre-
treatment period (in days) is the interval [- 480, -240), and the post-treatment period is the interval [-
240; 0]. 
 
                                                        
30
 We show below that the results are not driven by the choice of this specific interval. 
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An eyeballing assessment of these parallel trends figures suggests that, 
indeed, the two groups appear to follow parallel trends prior to divergence during 
this eight-month period preceding disclosure of the data breach. This strengthens the 
causal interpretation of differences during this eight-month period. The parallel trend 
graph for open interest clearly shows the increase in the number of outstanding put 
options in the treatment group. Differences in volume, on the other hand, seem 
driven by a decrease in the control group. (We note that both represent valid 
identification approaches for inferring average treatment effects in a difference-in-
differences design.) 
Proceeding to the statistical analysis, as before we first estimate the 
difference in pre-post differences of log open interest / log volume between 
treatment and control firms. The results of each estimation are shown in Table 8.  As 
can be seen from the upper panel of the table, for open interest we estimate an 
average treatment effect of between .26 and .32 log points in the pre-post difference 
in open interest of put options written on target firms, and the result is consistent and 
statistically significant across nearly every specification. The only insignificant 
specification has the fewest covariates included, but the point estimate is similar and 
thus the insignificance is likely to be driven by noise in the data.  Similar results 
emerge from our volume estimations (bottom panel), where we find an average 
positive treatment effect of between .23 and .36 log points.
31
 As with the cross-
sectional estimation, the result is significant and increases in magnitude as additional 
covariates are included in the propensity score matching, indicating that initial 
statistical insignificance may simply reflect estimation noise driven by over-
weighting of firms that are more different from each other. 
As with our cross-sectional estimations, we test how sensitive these results 
are to the propensity-score matching method.  Specifically, we re-estimate the 
average treatment effects from Table 8 with all covariates, again using three distinct 
alternative methods for matching.  These sensitivity tests are illustrated in Table 9 
below.  As before, we continue to find that our results are largely robust, remaining 
positive and significant for nearly every matching method, and similar in magnitude 
to the propensity-score estimation. 
 
  
                                                        
31
 Comparing to the summary statistics in Table 2, the economic significance of the estimated 
coefficients is somewhat smaller than in the cross-sectional analysis; but it is still appreciable. 
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Log Open Interest 
 
Log Volume 
 
Table 8: Difference in Differences Estimation; Log Open Interest (upper panel); Log Volume (lower 
panel) 
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Log Open Interest 
 
Log Volume 
 
Table 9: Alternative Matching Techniques; Diff-in-Diff; Log Open Interest (upper panel) and Log 
Volume (lower panel) 
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Finally, as above, we consider whether the results are robust to our choice of 
the interval in the Difference-in-Differences approach, altering the “pre” / “post” 
treatment specifications.  The re-estimated results using a variety of different time 
horizons for open interest and volume are shown in the following Table: 
Log Open Interest 
 
Log Volume 
 
Table 10: Alternative Time Horizons; Difference-in-Differences Analysis; Log Open Interest (upper 
panel) and Log Volume (lower panel) 
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While some subsamples yield higher t-statistics than others, all point estimates are 
consistent in sign and magnitude regardless of the time window.  
 All told, our empirical analysis uncovers relatively pronounced evidence of 
market trading abnormalities in the options market prior to the public disclosure of a 
cybersecurity threat.  While the magnitude of the effect varies (as it invariably does) 
on the precise estimation methodology, our results appear to be robust across the 
conventional alternative candidates.   Although we are tempted at this stage simply 
to call it a day—relegating the practical details of policy responses to some unnamed 
future commentator—our professional duty (or our authorial zeal) impels us further 
to ask (a) whether the findings above pose a normative problem that securities law 
should address; and (b) if so, whether the tools already exist and/or are being 
developed for the task at hand.  It is to these questions we now turn. 
3. Normative Implications: Is Cyber-Trading Special? 
 Having detailed the empirical evidence that informed cyber-trading appears 
to occur in practice, we now turn to the “so what?” question: That is, does informed 
trading in advance of a cybersecurity breach disclosure raise important and 
idiosyncratic policy concerns for the efficient operation of capital markets?  If it 
does, then there would be a prima facie efficiency case for tailoring legal rules in 
order to account for cyber-trading concerns. If, in contrast, the concerns raised by 
informed cyber-trading are largely identical to those of “garden variety” information 
trading contexts, then would be no reason to treat the activity with any special degree 
of legal or regulatory scrutiny.    
In the policy debate surrounding informed securities market trading—as well 
as how/whether it should be regulated legally—finance-oriented commentators have 
advanced at least four policy dimensions worthy of attention
32
: (1) price discovery, 
(2) distributional fairness, (3) market liquidity, and (4) allocative efficiency. We 
discuss each in turn below. Our analysis suggests that while informed cyber-trading 
does not seem particularly special when viewed against any of the first three 
dimensions on this list, it raises potentially unique efficiency concerns as to the 
fourth, plausibly justifying sui-generis regulatory scrutiny.  
  
                                                        
32
 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Insider Trading: Economics, Politics, and Policy 21-47 (AEI Press 
1991). Another relevant policy dimension concerns strategic incentives of corporate insiders 
themselves (such as whether to delay disclosure of information in order to permit informed trading). 
Id. We exclude these considerations here, since the predominant set of issues concerns non-statutory 
insiders. 
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Price Discovery 
Consider first the desideratum of pricing efficiency: i.e., the proposition that 
capital markets should be structured to facilitate the systematic adjustment of prices 
to incorporate relevant information about the “fundamentals” underlying traded 
securities.  When satisfied (at least roughly), pricing efficiency assists market 
participants in making sound portfolio choices, and it helps firms to finance value-
enhancing projects. Indeed, as has long been known (and celebrated) by economists, 
market prices are often an excellent mechanism to summarize and convey 
information about the underlying economic attributes of an asset (e.g., its scarcity, 
riskiness, etc.), a benefit that frees many market participants (though perhaps not all) 
from the costly task of having to investigate and verify such matters directly.
33
 A 
closely related corollary to pricing efficiency follows immediately: that it is 
preferable for securities prices to adjust rapidly as market and company 
fundamentals change, rather than on a delayed or attenuated basis (where pricing 
inaccuracies persist). Such rapid price “discovery” ensures that relevant information 
about market fundamentals flows to individuals as quickly as possible, further 
enabling them to make sound portfolio choices.   
To the extent one views price discovery as important (and most economists 
do), it typically counsels for a permissive stance on informed trading. Although most 
securities markets are thought to reflect relevant publicly available information 
(sometimes called “semi-strong” efficient), informed trading can sharpen that 
accuracy by hastening the incorporation of new information into market price. If 
informed traders to are permitted to trade freely on the basis of their information, the 
argument goes, their own trading activity will systematically drive up (or down) the 
price of a financial asset whenever it is under- (or over-) priced based on the newly-
arrived information.
 34
 Indeed, not only will the prospect of arbitraging the 
information be attractive to such traders, but it will also motivate at least some of 
them to monitor new information in the first place.  The ensuing price change 
effectively transmits the import of that new information to other market participants, 
providing a public good that enhances overall pricing efficiency. 
Informed cyber-trading shares many of these traits.  Given a known 
vulnerability that will soon be disclosed, informed trading induces market prices to 
approach fundamentals.  Moreover, one might argue, the ability to profit from that 
information helps induce aspiring arbitrageurs to discover information about 
vulnerabilities. Thus, in our view, the relative merits of informed trading for price 
                                                        
33
 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519,528 (1945). It is 
worth noting, of course, that when the set of underlying economic attributes at stake is sufficiently 
varied and rich, price—a unidimensional piece of information—may become a less reliable 
embodiment of such attributes.  See, e.g., A. Chakraborty & Bilge Yılmaz, “Manipulation in Market 
Order Models.” Journal of Financial Markets, 7(2): 187–206 (2004). 
34
 See, e.g., Manne, Henry, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966); Macey, supra note __. 
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discovery remain relatively consistent (at least on first approximation) when one 
compares informed cyber-trading to garden variety information trading.  There does 
not seem to be much of a compelling argument—at least on the basis of this 
desideratum—that counsels for more rigorous relative scrutiny. 
Distributional Fairness 
The desideratum of pricing efficiency just discussed consciously accepts the 
reality that the price discovery process will—by definition—produce (informed) 
winners and (uninformed) losers in individual trades, and that their interaction 
through the market will provide a public good of price discovery.  From a pure 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency perspective, this outcome seems eminently defensible, since 
winners and losers in the trading market are largely engaged in making / receiving 
transfer payments from one another—activities that play a neutral role in efficiency 
calculus. At the same time, to the extent that one’s measure of economic welfare also 
places weight on distributional equity,
35
 the transfer payments that facilitate price 
discovery may matter too—particularly if the identity of the winners and losers in 
this process is highly correlated across trades and over time, permitting certain 
traders to make systematic arbitrage rents at the expense of others.  To the extent that 
winning and losing is systematic in information trading, the prospect of a 
consistently unlevel playing field in securities markets might well be a significant 
welfare cost of price discovery—one that attenuates the case for pursuing perfect (or 
near perfect) pricing efficiency.
36
  
Although economic-minded commentators vary in the extent to which they 
value distributive equity concerns in the context of informed trading,
 37
 resolving this 
longstanding disagreement proves unnecessary here: for distributive fairness 
concerns—while plausibly relevant—shed little additional light on the problem in 
the context of informed cyber-trading. To be sure, given the scarcity of 
programming/hacking talent and access to large trading platforms, it is plausible that 
                                                        
35
 See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, “Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and a Theory of Fairness,” 4 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 223-47 (1975) (advancing such a theory). 
36
 It should be noted that the “level playing field” rationale for securities law—a rough proxy for 
distributive fairness—has largely been rejected as a formal statutory goal by courts.  See, e.g., 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (rejecting the “level playing field” desideratum 
advanced by the SEC).  Remaining mindful of the difference between “is” and “ought,” however, it is 
worthwhile pondering fairness anyway, since it remains a relevant normative criterion from a policy 
perspective. 
37
 See generally Michael J. Fishman; Kathleen M. Hagerty, “Insider Trading and the Efficiency of 
Stock Prices,” 23 RAND J. Econ. 106-122 (1992); Kim Krawiec, “Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider 
Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age,” 94 N’Western L. Rev. 443 
(2001). There is also a longstanding debate about whether distributional fairness concerns—even if 
relevant from a welfare perspective—should enter into liability standards at all, or rather should be 
capitalized into tax-and-transfer systems. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus 
Welfare (Harvard Press 2002).  This argument is particularly unhelpful here, however, since securities 
markets are global and many participants are beyond the taxing authority of any single governmental 
actor. 
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informed cyber-traders may enjoy systematic rents across firms, across transactions 
and over time.  It is also plausible that their informed trades bring information of 
tremendous value to the market through the pricing mechanism, tipping off not only 
uninformed traders but also the firms themselves about the risk of a hack. That said, 
a similar (if not identical) set of tradeoffs appears manifest in virtually any informed 
trading context. Consequently, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to 
accord greater (or lesser) scrutiny to informed cyber-trading than any other type of 
informed trading activity. 
Market Liquidity 
A third consideration that often attends the insider trading debate—and one 
that combines the two aforementioned concerns—concerns market liquidity.  To the 
extent that informed parties are allowed to participate in market trading, they will 
typically transact their business alongside or with uninformed market participants, 
who know that they stand a large chance of being taken advantage through their 
trades.  In markets known to be populated with information traders, however, 
uninformed market participants can become understandably reluctant to trade.  
Indeed, the very fact that a (possibly) informed trader wishes to buy/sell a financial 
asset may itself constitute a strong signal that one stands to lose by serving as 
counterparty to the proposed transaction. In fact, in the extreme case where the 
predominant driver of trade private information, trading among uninformed 
counterparties can shut down completely, leading to the near collapse of a market
38
 – 
a consequence that is, ironically enough, deeply antithetical to price discovery. 
Informed traders, therefore, play simultaneously heroic and parasitic roles in their 
relationship with other traders: They heroically contribute to price discovery; but 
they parasitically require liquidity-trader participation order to make information 
arbitrage profitable, since their very presence can systematically deter such 
participation.
39
 Consequently, even when pricing efficiency is of vital importance 
and distributive equity concerns are assumed away, it may be efficiency enhancing 
for market regulators to embrace a compromise where information trading is 
permitted, yet limited in magnitude to a level that does not engender market 
dysfunction or illiquidity.
40
 
As above, however, the importance of depth and liquidity in capital markets 
in the context of informed cyber-trading does not seem systematically distinct from 
its importance in the general context of informed trading. In both cases, extreme 
prevalence of private information can cause markets to seize up, thereby justifying 
(at least potentially) some outer limits on ability of participants to exploit 
information advantages. Though the precise boundary that such limits should demark 
                                                        
38
 Milgrom & Stokey, supra n. __ 
39
 See Kyle, supra n. __ 
40
 See Stoll, supra n. __; Glosten & Milgrom, supra n. __. 
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is far from clear, there is also little reason to think that its location is dramatically 
different in the context of informed cyber-trading. 
Allocative Efficiency 
Finally, informed trading in securities markets can foment a host of different 
issues related to allocative efficiency, in which market participants may incur costly 
expenditures in order to facilitate and/or prevent the transfer payments that attend 
information arbitrage. Aspiring informed traders, for example, may overinvest in 
acquiring inside information about existing (but as-yet-undisclosed) risks, or in 
keeping such information proprietary, hoping to exploit it maximally for personal 
advantage.  Potential market counterparties, in turn, may respond by overinvesting 
themselves, suspicious that their counterparty is an informed trader attempting to 
exploit their ignorance.  The issuers, too, might get into the mix, attempting to avoid 
the costs and embarrassment of having a third party expose a latent problem or risk.  
In the end, prices would no doubt be exceedingly accurate, reflecting (and quickly 
adjusting) to each new change in information. But such pricing efficiency provides 
little if anything in the way of public goods, since market participants have little to 
learn, having already incurred substantial costs to acquire that information directly.
 41
  
As with the analysis above, informed cyber-trading shares several of the 
same allocative efficiency concerns as those that apply to the more general 
information-trading scenario: Traders and firms may have similar sorts of incentives 
to invest “too much” (from a social perspective) in divining latent facts. We submit, 
however, that at least two additional considerations make informed cyber-trading 
different—and in many respects more worrisome—than the general case. They are as 
follows: 
 First, unlike the garden-variety case of informed trading—where the underlying 
new information happens independently—with informed cyber-trading the new 
information is, in a meaningful respect, an endogenous harm that is substantially 
“created” by the hacker to be visited on the firm. Where the hacker actively steals 
proprietary data (such as employee social security numbers), this endogeneity is 
obvious. But even when the hacker merely exposes an existing vulnerability, the 
hacker’s actions are still akin to imposing a harm on the target. For example, the 
underlying vulnerability exposed might have gone undetected for the foreseeable 
future, had it not been for the prospect of extracting cyber-trading rents. 
Moreover, the cybersecurity vulnerability—once exposed—can easily 
compound, furnishing a digital roadmap for countless nefarious actors seeking to 
exploit the target’s likely vulnerabilities. 42 (Even if the target is able to conjure 
                                                        
41
 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, “On Insider Trading, Markets, and ‘Negative’ 
Property Rights in Information,” 87 U. Va. L. Rev. 1230 (2001). 
42
 Muddy Waters’ research report on St. Jude, for example, contained a detailed 34-page description 
of how to exploit two different vulnerabilities in the St. Jude pace-makers, including step-by-step 
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up a quick fix for the specific hack disclosed, its software vulnerability may be 
far more systematic, and in any event the exposed firm often becomes target 
practice for other hackers in the wake of the initial disclosure, driving the cyber-
trader’s profits higher still.)  In many respects, then, hacker creates and then 
imposes a unique harm on the targeted company—one that is qualitatively 
different from garden-variety “exogenous” information shocks serendipitously 
observed by an information trader.  Allowing a coordinated hacker-trader team to 
capture these arbitrage gains, then, would implicitly subsidize the very harm-
creating activity that is being “discovered” in the first instance. 
 Second, and relatedly, when hackers have an enhanced incentive to create such 
harms, targets also have an enhanced incentive to undertake costly precautionary 
measures meant to deter (or divert) hacker activity.  In many situations, such 
undertakings can be considerable, such as investing in added internal cyber-
hacking squads, or offering attractive third-party “bounties” to those who detect 
and bring forward unknown vulnerabilities.  These incentives are perhaps 
maximal in instances where a target’s risk of hacking increases when it is 
identified as the “weakest link” among potential targets.  For in such settings, a 
type of “arms race” to self-protect can ensue among potential targets, whereby 
each effectively “doubles down” on the equilibrium influence costs borne by 
hackers and targets alike.
43
   
Informed cyber-trading therefore raises unique allocative efficiency 
considerations relative to garden-variety information trading.  Consequently, policy-
minded legal actors might do well at least to consider whether—in the light of these 
sui-generis costs—informed cyber-trading warrants heightened scrutiny by courts. In 
the next section, we consider whether legal institutions under the status quo are up to 
the task. 
4. Prescriptive Challenges 
The previous sections have established (a) that informed cyber-trading in the 
securities markets occurs at a statistically and economically significant scale, and (b) 
that the practice raises certain idiosyncratic policy concerns that are not generically 
present in canonical cases of informed.  In the light of these observations, we now 
turn to the prescriptive question of how legal institutions might address informed 
cyber-trading in those circumstances where policy concerns justify special scrutiny. 
More concretely, our approach here is to inform the pragmatic discussion as to (a) 
whether current law acts to deter informed cyber-trading trading, and (b) if not, how 
                                                                                                                                                             
instructions detailing even what type of equipment to purchase on internet shopping sites (such as e-
Bay) to consummate the hack. See Muddy Waters Research Report, supra note 1, at 2-9. 
43 We consider these incentives in detail in a technical companion piece. See Mitts & Talley, 
Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches: Technical Companion (unpublished manuscript 2017) 
(available from authors upon request). 
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one might adapt current legal institutions to address more effectively informed 
cyber-trading activity. We will advance the thesis that—outside of certain special 
contexts—under current law the prospects for trader liability is a surprisingly 
tenuous fit with normative policy concerns, and is more frequently either ineffectual 
or. The two most promising ways to adapt current law to address informed cyber-
trading—extending insider-trading liability to “outsiders,” or expanding the reach of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)—both fall short (in different ways) in 
addressing the distinct normative quandaries raised by the practice.
44
 
 To frame and situate our prescriptive discussion, consider Table 11 below, 
which subdivides the legal policy question by positing the possibility that the hacker 
and the trader may be different persons with different individual interests: 
 
Table 11: Representation of Hacker’s and Trader’s Interaction 
The columns of the Table posit that the objectives of the “hacker” (a term we use 
broadly, to include both “white hat” and “black hat” hackers) can be motivated either 
by a desire (i) to exploit the target’s vulnerabilities in order to steal data; or (ii) 
merely to detect and publicize such the target’s vulnerabilities. The rows, in contrast, 
denote the trader’s interaction with the hacker, distinguishing contexts where the 
trading entity is either (i) independent from the hacker (e.g., it learns of the hack 
through independent means) or (ii) directs, coordinates or transacts with the hacker 
in pursuit of a common aim.
 45
 (While intermediate interests / degrees of 
coordination are no doubt possible, Table 11 represents an adequate as a first 
approximation for our analytic task.) 
                                                        
44
 The discussion below seems particularly timely in the light of the recent high-profile cybersecurity 
breaches, including the attack on the SEC's EDGAR website, a database of draft corporate filings – a 
natural goldmine for hackers seeking material nonpublic information ("MNPI") prior to public 
disclosure. Hannah Kuchler, Hackers Target Weakest Links for Insider Trading Gain, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/13a317ce-a561-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2; 
Alexandra Stevenson & Carlos Tejada, S.E.C. Says It Was a Victim of Computer Hacking Last Year, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/business/sec-hacking-attack.html.  
45
 In cases where the hacker and trader are the same person, of course, the degree of coordination 
between the two is complete, so that such situations would fit easily into the top row of Table 11. 
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Each resulting permutation from this two-by-two matrix (denoted Scenario I 
through Scenario IV) entails slightly different normative and doctrinal 
considerations, thereby warranting slightly different analysis. Scenario I, wherein the 
trader works actively with the hacker to steal confidential data, corresponds to the 
strongest normative policy concerns, since the breach involves the loss of 
confidential information and the coordinated efforts of the trader and hacker (which 
can in turn facilitate explicit or implicit incentive structures that exacerbate ex ante 
hacking/protection incentives).  Scenario II, while stopping short of outright data 
theft, also tends to entail many of the policy concerns of Scenario I, since the 
exposure of vulnerabilities can (as noted above) visit “harms” on the target that are 
effectively subsidized through coordination with a trader. The remaining cells 
correspond to situations where the trader independently learns that of a hacker’s 
outright theft (Scenario III) or mere detection of vulnerabilities (Scenario IV), but 
without coordinating efforts with the hacker. As suggested above, these scenarios 
present weaker cases for placing liability on the trader, since (a) trading incentives 
are (by hypothesis) divorced from hacking incentives, and (b) the trader’s activity 
might even expose (via the price) the existence of the hack to the public and the 
target.
46
 As a rough approximation, then, an efficiency-minded legal decision maker 
would tend to place the greatest amount of scrutiny on the upper row of the Table 
(Scenarios I and II).  As we show below, however, current law does not appear to 
have the same reach. Even the “easiest” case for scrutiny—Scenario I—can prove to 
be a stretch in establishing liability (particularly for traders), with perhaps the most 
leverage coming through criminal sanctions; the levers for civil liability (brought 
either by government regulators or private parties) appear even more limited and/or 
untested under current law. And, while current law could be adapted to be a better 
prescriptive “fit,” doing so would require either structural statutory reform, or that 
courts to be receptive to novel (and largely untested) innovations. 
To help illustrate our claims, consider the seemingly “easy” case of Scenario 
I, where a trader explicitly coordinates with and/or directs a hacker to purloin 
confidential data from a target company. As noted above, this permutation presents 
the strongest policy case for legal / regulatory scrutiny. And, as it happens, this 
particular scenario has garnered disproportionate attention to date from courts and 
regulators. Here, it appears that courts have been open to applying both federal 
securities and data breach statutes to impose legal exposure on both hackers and 
traders.
47
 Interestingly, however, the doctrinal divinations needed to impose liability 
                                                        
46
 This is not to say that one would have no concerns in these permutations. For example, one could 
argue that when an unaffiliated trader learns of an active theft of data (Scenario III), the trader should 
be under a “Good Samaritan” – like duty to disclose the information. That said, such considerations 
do not appear to raise sui-generis normative concerns in the case of data breach when compared to 
other possible latent harms discovered by a trader. 
47
 See Vollmer, Andrew N., Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud (September 24, 2015). 47 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. 1985 (October 19, 2015); Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 26. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679092  
MAR. 2018  INFORMED TRADING AND CYBERSECURITY BREACHES   
 
 
31 
risk on such actors—while admirably creative—are still an awkward fit with the type 
of legal oversight one might design from a blank slate to deal with informed cyber-
trading.   
Our analysis of these considerations need not be confined to abstract 
hypotheticals, however: For the legal dimensions of Scenario I are evolving even as 
of this writing—in the form governmental complaints in an interrelated cluster of 
high-profile actions (the “Dubovoy case”).48  These cases constitute in many ways a 
virtually perfect case study of Scenario I. In its civil complaints filed in 2015 and 
2016, the SEC charged more than 40 defendants with securities fraud and related 
charges stemming from an alleged international hacking-and-trading scheme 
organized by Ukrainian nationals Ivan Turchynov and Aleksandr Ieremenko (the 
“Dubovoy Hackers”).49  The U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the District of New Jersey 
and the Eastern District of New York followed with criminal actions against a subset 
of the named defendants in the SEC case, including the Dubovoy Hackers and traders 
(including hedge fund managers and their investment firms
50
)
 
located both in the 
U.S. and abroad (“Dubovoy Traders”).51   
According to government documents, the Dubovoy Hackers repeatedly “used 
deceptive means”52 over a five-year period to breach computer networks at several 
U.S. business newswire services (e.g., Marketwired, PR Newswire, and Business 
Wire)
53
 extracting material non-public information (MNPI) in the form of 
“confidential earnings information for numerous publicly-traded companies from 
press releases that had not yet been released to the public.” The Hackers then sold 
the purloined data to the Dubovoy Traders,
54
 as part of an orchestrated and 
coordinated plan. Indeed, the government asserts that the Dubuvoy Traders even 
provided the Hackers with “shopping lists” of desired press releases, accessed the 
                                                        
48
 Complaint, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed August 10, 
2015).  Indictment, U.S. v. Korchevsky et al., No. 15-cr-00381 (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 5, 2015).  
Indictment, U.S. v. Turchynov et al., No. 15-cr-00390 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 6, 2015). A subsequent 
complaint named additional defendants.  See Complaint, SEC v. Zavodchiko et al, No. 2:16-cv-00845  
(D.N.J., filed Feb. 17, 2016). 
49
 Jonathan Stempel, SEC Brings New Charges Over Global Press Release Hacking Scheme, 
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trading-cyber-sec/sec-brings-new-
charges-over-global-press-release-hacking-scheme-idUSKCN0VR25N. 
50
 Cory Bennett, Hackers Cash in with Insider Trading, The Hill (Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/251174-hackers-cash-in-with-insider-trading; Nate Raymond, 
Russia Investor, Funds Pay $18 Million to Settle U.S. Press Release Hacking Case, Reuters (Mar. 25, 
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insidertrading-cyber-sec/russia-investor-funds-pay-18-
million-to-settle-u-s-press-release-hacking-case-idUSKCN0WR1A4. 
51
 SEC, SEC Charges 32 Defendants in Scheme to Trade on Hacked News Releases, Press Release 
2015-163 (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-163.html. 
52
 Complaint ¶ 71, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed August 10, 
2015).   
53
 Indictment ¶ 14, U.S. v. Turchynov et al., No. 15-cr-00390 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 6, 2015). 
54
 Complaint ¶¶ 1-3, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed August 
10, 2015).   
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stolen MNPI through secured overseas computer servers,
55
 and then “used that stolen 
[MNPI] to trade securities and reap over $100 million in unlawful profits.”56  The 
Dubovoy Traders are further alleged to have used “deceptive means,” including the 
use of multiple fictitious accounts and entities, to conceal their trading activities.
57
   
In its criminal indictment of the Traders, the government alleged a series of 
transgressions under federal criminal law, including:
58
 
 Securities Fraud under Rule 10b-5, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 
(Manipulative and Deceptive Devices) and 78ff (Penalties), 17 CFR 240.10b-
5 (Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices), and 18 U.S.C. §2 
(Principals). 
 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1830 (a.k.a., the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, or “CFAA,” 
discussed below). 
 Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349 (Attempt and 
Conspiracy). 
 Money Laundering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 
(Laundering of Monetary Instruments). 
The securities fraud and CFAA charges play prominent roles here, since (a) they 
embody the most general-purpose charges in the informed cyber-trading context; and 
(b) they constitute critical predicate offenses for criminal liability under wire fraud 
and money laundering statutes.
 
The majority of individuals indicted by the DOJ 
reached plea agreements with federal prosecutors between December 2015 and 
August 2016, pleading guilty to the wire fraud conspiracy counts, with the DOJ 
dropping most of the predicate criminal charges.
59
 Such criminal settlements are not 
uncommon, and—in a sense—they provide a measure of deterrence to others who 
would attempt similar conduct in the future. And yet, the Dubuvoy plea agreements 
                                                        
55
 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Hacker Sentenced To 30 Months In Prison For Role In Largest Known 
Computer Hacking And Securities Fraud Scheme, Press Release (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/hacker-sentenced-30-months-prison-role-largest-known-computer-
hacking-and-securities. 
56
 Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed August 10, 
2015).   
57
 Id. ¶ 7. 
58
 Indictment ¶¶ 112-145, U.S. v. Turchynov et al., No. 15-cr-00390 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 6, 2015).  In 
addition to the offenses listed in association with the Dubovoy Traders, it may be of interest that the 
Dubovoy Hackers were also charged with crimes such as conspiracy to commit fraud and related 
activity in connection with computers, fraud and related activity in connection with computers, and 
aggravated identity theft.  The Eastern District of New York charged the defendants with an 
overlapping set of crimes: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, Conspiracy to Commit Securities 
Fraud, Securities Fraud, and Money Laundering Conspiracy.  Indictment ¶¶  45-55, U.S. v. 
Korchevsky et al., No. 15-cr-00381 (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 5, 2015).   
59
 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Hacker Sentenced To 30 Months In Prison For Role In Largest Known 
Computer Hacking And Securities Fraud Scheme, Press Release (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/hacker-sentenced-30-months-prison-role-largest-known-computer-
hacking-and-securities. 
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also leave open the interesting question of whether the predicate securities fraud 
and/or CFAA charges themselves would have had traction had they been pursued to 
trial.
60
 We thus consider each below, in turn. 
Securities Fraud Liability 
Consider first the allegations of securities fraud.  Here, in pursuing its 
criminal claims, the government had the benefit of additional enforcement expertise: 
As frequently happens in securities fraud contexts,
61
 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) coordinated with federal prosecutors, and it also filed a series of 
independent civil claims alleging securities fraud by the Dubuvoy traders. These 
allegations
62
 include:   
 Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder
63
. 
 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”)64. 
 Sections 20(b)65 and (e)66 of the ‘34 Act. 
                                                        
60
 It bears noting that the defendants were also charged with identity theft under federal law, which 
might also have carried weight as a predicate offense for wire fraud / money laundering. 
61
 See Mary Jo White, “All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal 
Actions to Police the Markets,” (March 31, 2014). 
62
 Complaint ¶¶ 222-234, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed 
August 10, 2015).   
63
 Complaint ¶¶ 225-227, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed 
August 10, 2015) (“By engaging in the conduct described above, defendants knowingly or recklessly, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, directly or indirectly, by use the means or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the mails, or the facilities of a national securities 
exchange: (a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of 
material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or (c) engaged in acts, 
practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security…By engaging in the foregoing conduct 
defendants violated, and unless enjoined will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act.”). 
64
 Complaint ¶¶ 222-224, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed 
August 10, 2015) (“Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, knowingly or recklessly, 
in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instruments of 
transportation, or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: 
(a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) obtained money or property by means of 
untrue statements of material facts, or omissions to state material facts necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or 
(c) engaged in transactions, practices or courses of business which operated or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser…By engaging in the foregoing conduct, defendants violated, and 
unless enjoined will continue to violate, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.”). 
65
 Section 20(b) of the ’34 Act “broadly prohibits violating federal securities law through the means of 
another person.”  William D. Roth, The Role of Section 20(b) in Securities Litigation, Harvard Bus. 
Law Rev. Online (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.hblr.org/2015/12/the-role-of-section-20b-in-securities-
litigation/.  Complaint ¶¶ 232-234, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., 
filed August 10, 2015) (“By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the trader defendants violated Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule lOb-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], thereunder 
through or by means of the hacker defendants. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, pursuant to 
Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)], defendants, except Ieremenko and 
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As with the criminal case, Rule 10b-5 plays a starring—and indeed central—role 
here, as several of the other charges effectively “bootstrap” to the 10b-5 allegations. 
Note, however, that CFAA claims are wholly absent in the SEC’s complaint (since 
CFAA enforcement is not part of the Commission’s regulatory mandate). 
Several of the SEC’s parallel cases remain pending as of this writing, and it 
appears most have been stayed pending the resolution of remaining criminal 
actions.
67
 That said, at least two opinions have already emanated from the civil 
actions, both relevant to our inquiry here.  First, shortly after the SEC complaint was 
filed, the District Court in New Jersey entered a temporary restraining order freezing 
defendants’ assets and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should 
not enter.
68
  A subset of the Dubovoy Traders (the “Amaryan Defendants”) appealed 
this order.
69
  On October 16, 2015, the court issued an opinion (the “Amaryan 
Opinion”) granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction because it had 
“raise[d] a strong inference that the Amaryan Defendants violated federal securities 
laws . . . .”70   On February 12, 2016, hedge fund Memelland Investments Ltd. 
(“Memelland”), another of the Dubovoy Traders, filed a motion to dismiss under 
FRCP 12(b)(6).  On September 29, 2016, the court issued a second opinion (the 
“Memelland Opinion”) denying Memelland’s motion because “the SEC particularly 
pled its fraud and aiding and abetting claims,” giving rise to a strong inference that 
Memelland acted with scienter to “deceive, manipulate or defraud.”71 As of February 
2018, the Amaryan and Memelland Opinions appear to be the only two opinions 
released in this matter, though the SEC has reached settlements with several of the 
Dubovoy Traders.
72
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Turchynov, violated, an unless enjoined will continue to violate Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 1 Ob-5 [17 C.F .R. § 240.1 Ob-5], thereunder.”). 
66
 Complaint ¶¶ 228-231, SEC v. Dubovoy, et al., No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed 
August 10, 2015) (“Through their illicit trading, payments to the hacker defendants, instruction about 
which releases to obtain, and other means alleged in this Complaint, the trader defendants knowingly 
provided substantial assistance to, and thereby aided and abetted~ the hacker defendants in connection 
with the hacker defendants' violations of the securities laws.  By engaging in the foregoing conduct, 
pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Act and Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, defendants, 
except Ieremenko and Turchynov, violated, an unless enjoined will continue to violate Section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] 
and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], thereunder.”) 
67
 John Reed Stark, Think the SEC EDGAR Data Breach Involved Insider Trading? Think Again., 
D&O DIARY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-
think-sec-edgar-data-breach-involved-insider-trading-think/. 
68
 SEC v. Dubovoy, No. CV 15-6076, 2016 WL 5745099, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2016). 
69
 Id.   
70
 SEC v. Dubovoy, No. CV 15-6076, 2015 WL 6122261, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2015). 
71
 SEC v. Dubovoy, No. CV 15-6076, 2016 WL 5745099, at *1, 5 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2016). 
72
 SEC, Trader Agrees to Settle Claims Relating to Hacked News Release Scheme; SEC's Recovery to 
Date in Connection with the Scheme Exceeds $52 Million, Litigation Release No. 23530 (May 4, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23530.htm (For example, “Without admitting 
or denying the allegations in the SEC's complaint, Makarov agreed to be permanently enjoined from 
violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and pay disgorgement of $100,000.”). 
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But what about the underlying merit of the securities fraud allegation 
(whether criminal or civil)? Here, things become surprisingly opaque. The familiar 
10b-5 claim for securities fraud charges turns on the showing—in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security—of the use a device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud; an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit; or, the making of any untrue statement (and in certain cases, 
omission) of a material fact.
 73
  As noted above, Rule 10b-5 is extremely general, 
covering both conventional fraud and “insider trading” claims; and both are at least 
theoretically in play in the case of informed cyber-trading.  At the same time, both 
prove to be awkward fits in many plausible factual scenarios. 
The offense of “insider trading” is not explicitly codified in Rule 10b-5, but 
instead emerged as a judicial construction of the Rule that effectively equates an 
informed trader’s silence (in appropriate circumstances) with an affirmative 
misstatement of material fact. In this respect, the doctrine is a bit of catch-all, 
broadening the application of the Rule beyond a strict construction of its text.
74
  
Nevertheless, even when read in this broad fashion, insider trading has time-honored 
boundaries that make it a difficult fit, even in Scenario I.  
There are two predominant pathways to prove insider trading under Rule 
10b-5, frequently referred to as the “classical” and “misappropriation” theories.  The 
classical theory—developed first—teaches that “a corporate insider 75  (with a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders) may not trade in the securities of his 
or her corporation on the basis of material information not generally known to the 
investing public, and which, if made public, would substantially affect the judgment 
of a reasonable investor.” 76   The classical theory was easily expanded to cover 
                                                        
73
 The specific text of Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.” 
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. 
74
 Stark, supra note __.This judicial construction has a long pedigree: the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Superintendent v. Bankers Life  that the antifraud provisions should be applied broadly, such that 
“Rule 10b-5 prohibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of 
deception.” Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 
(1971); Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 574 (2008). 
75
 These include statutory insiders under Section 16A, as well as certain “constructive” insiders who 
are in a relationship of trust and confidence with the issuer. See Dirks, at note 14.  
76
 Hagar Cohen, Cracking Hacking: Expanding Insider Trading Liability in the Digital Age, 17 Sw. J. 
Int'l L. 259, 265 (2011).  See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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“tippee” outsiders who receive MNPI from “tipper” insiders (who themselves 
receive a personal benefit from tipping) and trade with knowledge (actual or 
reasonable) that the insider(s) breached their duties by tipping for personal benefit.
77
  
Misappropriation theory—developed later—further expanded insider trading 
liability such that “a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates 
confidential information for the purpose of securities trading, in breach of a duty 
owed to the source of the information, rather than to the shareholders of the [issuing] 
corporation.”78  The misappropriation theory thus reached certain types of corporate 
outsiders who nonetheless “deal in deception” against a third-party owner of 
information by ““pretend[ing] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the 
principal's information for personal gain.”79 
Under either classical or misappropriation theory, then, the insider-trading 
prohibition has come to be understood to mean that “individuals may not purchase or 
sell securities based on knowledge of nonpublic information that they legally 
obtained or possessed as a consequence of their employment or similar 
circumstances.” 80   That is, the linchpin for deducing whether actionable insider 
trading has occurred under the Rule is by “equating a breach of fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like duty [toward the information’s rightful owner] with the fraud 
requirement.”81 
And therein lies the rub: As capacious as insider trading theories have 
become, the accepted doctrinal framework squares poorly with the canonical case of 
informed cyber-trading (as well as the facts of Dubuvoy), where the hacker and 
trader are neither fiduciaries of the target nor of a third party information “owner”.82 
Indeed, it is hard to see how Scenario I would trigger any liability under the received 
insider trading framework, since no fiduciary relationship is breached when a hacker 
targets an unrelated company’s MNPI, and then passes such information in a 
coordinated fashion to a trader.  Simply (if ironically) pier, “mere thieves” of 
MNPI—even those who profit from it through market transactions—are not insiders 
according to Rule 10b-5.
83
   
That said, a series of recent cases have experimented with an alternative 
application of Rule 10b-5 to informed cyber-trading—one that characterizes the 
                                                        
77
 Cohen, supra note 76 at 266-67.  See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Salman v. United 
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 Cohen, supra note 76 at 267.  See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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 See Stark, supra n. __. 
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conduct not strictly as a species of insider trading per se, but rather as a hybrid with 
conventional securities fraud, in which the cyber-traders make use of a “deceptive 
device” in relation to securities transactions.  Because it leans on a conventional 
fraud claim, this extension dispenses with the burden of demonstrating the breach (or 
even the existence) of any fiduciary relationship.  That said, it is a “[f]ar more 
complex and challenging” theory of liability for government regulators to pursue.84 
Under several accountings, the government’s theory represents a new paradigm of 
unlawful “outsider trading” under Rule 10b-5 to reach “a third and new category of 
securities miscreant — ‘outsiders’ — who do not work for (or with) the company, 
and who do not owe a duty to anyone.”85  This new category aims to capture trading 
on the basis of MNPI obtained via computer hacking in situations (like Scenario I), 
lacking the fiduciary relationship required by insider trading law, but still reflecting 
the requisite degree of deception. Should courts prove receptive to this theory, it 
could certainly represent a bona fide threat of securities fraud exposure against a 
trader in Scenario I who coordinates with a hacker to detect / trade on stolen data.   
But what would a new theory of outsider trading look like? While still in 
nascent stages of development, the SEC has advanced the idea that cyber-trading 
“outsiders” can nonetheless be culpable under 10b-5 when, as part of the hack, they 
“are masquerading as company insiders….”86  In other words, under this theory, the 
deception element mandated by Rule 10b-5 relates “directly to the hacking or 
unauthorized computer access and is a bit more attenuated from the securities 
transaction.”87 Note that coordination between the hacker and trader envisaged by 
Scenario I (in the form of a common plan, scheme, or transaction) appears to be 
critical to this theory as well; for without such coordinated efforts (i.e., the hacker 
and trader act independently), it would be difficult to say that the deceptive hack was 
also “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” requirement, another 
critical requirement of Rule 10b-5.   
The emerging theory of outsider trading bears a strong resemblance to 
Donald Langevoort’s development of the idea of “intentional deception” should 
serve as a trigger of fraud liability, arguing that “[s]o long as an element of 
intentional deception was present in the action, the resulting trading would seem to 
satisfy the ‘in connection with’ requirement and lead to liability under Rule 10b-5.”88  
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 Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading Regulation, Enforcement, and Prevention § 6:14.  See also 
United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2001) (“O'Hagan 's [sic] requirement that the 
misappropriated information ‘ordinarily’ be valuable due to ‘its utility in securities trading,’…appears 
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Propounding the normative desirability of this test, Langevoort concludes, “[T]here 
is little reason to believe that gaining a trading advantage by deceptive theft is any 
less deserving of proscription under Rule 10b-5 than gaining a trading advantage by 
a secretive breach of fiduciary duty.”89  
While the outsider trading model remains a relatively untested prototype, the 
SEC has asserted facially similar charges against several outsider trading defendants 
for years.
90
  A decade ago, in SEC v. Dorozhko,
91
 the SEC had its best (and sole) 
opportunity thus far to establish a beachhead for outsider trading theory. In 
Dorozhko, Second Circuit confronted the question of “whether, in a civil 
enforcement lawsuit brought by the [SEC] under Section 10(b) of the [’34 Act], 
computer hacking may be ‘deceptive’ where the hacker did not breach a fiduciary 
duty in fraudulently obtaining [MNPI] used in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities.” 92   In the case, the SEC alleged that Dorozhko hacked into the 
computer network of an investor relations and web-hosting company to access 
unreleased earnings reports for IMS Health, Inc., which indicated that the company 
would miss its expected earnings, and subsequently traded on this MNPI through the 
purchase of put options.
93
  The Southern District of New York found that 
Dorozhko’s behavior “might be fraudulent and might violate a number of federal and 
state criminal statutes,” but that his behavior did not violate Section 10(b) because 
Dorozhko did not owe a fiduciary duty to either the web-hosting company or to the 
hacked company.
94
 Accordingly, it denied the SEC’s request for a preliminary 
injunction freezing Dorozhko’s trading account.  
A unanimous three-judge panel on the Second Circuit reversed and granted 
the injunction.
95
  Acknowledging that the SEC’s claim was “not based on either of 
the two generally accepted theories of insider trading,” Judge Cabranes’ opinion 
noted that the complaint was “nonetheless based on a claim of fraud” and accorded 
attention to “whether this fraud is ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of Section 
10(b).”96  Notably, the Second Circuit explained that “what is sufficient [to establish 
a breach of Section 10(b)] is not always what is necessary.”97  Because Dorozhko’s 
actions—hacking to gain access to and trade on MNPI—allegedly constituted an 
“affirmative misrepresentation” (as opposed to the nondisclosure in the insider-
trading context)
98, and because violation of the “affirmative obligation in commercial 
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dealings not to mislead” is “a distinct species of fraud,” the Second Circuit held that 
he could be liable under the antifraud rules despite the absence of a fiduciary 
relationship.
99
 
Having made the general point that a fiduciary relationship is not necessarily 
required under Section 10(b), the Second Circuit remanded the case to decide the 
fact-specific question of “whether the computer hacking in this case…as opposed to 
computer hacking in general…involved a fraudulent misrepresentation that was 
‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b)”.100  In doing so, the Court 
gave guidance regarding the ordinary meaning of  “deceptive,” which “covers a wide 
spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in falsehoods” and “irreducibly 
entails some act that gives the victim a false impression.”101  The Court infused 
ambiguity into its (otherwise clear) opinion by stating, “In our view, misrepresenting 
one’s identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off limits, and 
then stealing that information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of 
the word.  It is unclear, however, that exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to 
gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive,’ rather than being mere theft.”102  Thus, the 
Second Circuit asked the District Court to take a deeper dive into “how the hacker 
gained access” in order to determine whether the actions constituted “a ‘deceptive 
device or contrivance’ that is prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b– 5.”103  
Unfortunately (at least for us), Second Circuit panel’s invitation in Dorozhko was 
never formally taken up by the District Court on remand: Dorozhko’s attorney lost 
touch with his client and the trial court later granted summary judgment for the SEC.
 
104
   
A fair reading of the opinion nevertheless suggests that trading on hacked 
information might constitute actionable securities fraud, but only if accompanied by 
some manifested deception. According to one prominent commentator “hacking 
might not be a securities fraud if, for instance, it was based on discovering 
weaknesses in software rather than, a deception, such as a hacker using hijacked 
employee credentials.” 105   Thus, while negligently weak computer systems that 
“leav[e] a virtual door open for an online intruder” might not open the door to 
“deception,” the use of malware and the tools/processes more generally associated 
with the popular perception of hackers might suffice.
106
  Regulators and courts will 
no doubt grapple with defendants about where to draw this line should outsider-
trading theory gain a greater jurisprudential following.  
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Dorozhko’s unrequited invitation for doctrinal development is just one reason 
why Dubovoy represents a potentially watershed important moment for informed 
cyber-trading under federal securities law.  The Dubovoy pleadings are instructive, 
and they clearly evince the government’s deep familiarity with the language in 
Dorozhko, attempting to squeeze the underlying allegations within its ambit.  For 
example, The SEC’s complaint alleges that the Dubovoy Hackers used deception as 
follows
107
. 
The hacker defendants used deceptive means to gain unauthorized access to 
the Newswire Services’ computer systems, using tactics such as: (a) 
employing stolen username/password information of authorized users to 
pose as authorized users; (b) deploying malicious computer code designed 
to delete evidence of the computer attacks; (c) concealing the identity and 
location of the computers used to access the Newswire Services’ computers; 
and (d) using back-door access-modules. 
Moreover, the SEC’s initial complaint alleges that the Dubovoy Traders used 
deception to conceal their activities through shell entities and misleading 
payments,
108
 multiple trading accounts,
109
 and a secure server.
110
   
Based on the preliminary opinions thus far produced in the case, it appears 
courts have been sympathetic to such arguments.
111
  For example, in the Amaryan 
Opinion, without specifically elaborating on the legal standard required by Section 
10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the District Court suggests that “the evidence submitted by the 
SEC raises a strong inference that the Amaryan Defendants violated federal 
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securities laws.”112 And, even more recently, the SEC obtained a default judgment 
against several trading defendants on highly similar facts.  In SEC v Iat Hong, et al., 
several traders were charged with hacking into a law firm (by installing malware and 
compromising accounts that enabled access to law firm email accounts) and 
fraudulently trading on MNPI.  In the default judgment, the judge concluded that the 
evidence “sufficiently demonstrates that Defendants directly, indirectly, or through 
or by means of others, hacked into the nonpublic networks of two New York-
headquartered law firms and stole, through deception, confidential information 
covering several publicly-traded companies” and then “reaped illegal profits by 
trading on the stolen [MNPI]” in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(b) of the ’34 Act 
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, among other securities laws.
113
  While this was a default 
judgment rather than a litigated case, the SEC no doubt welcomes the judge’s 
description of this hacking as deceptive. 
Notwithstanding its evident traction in judicial opinions, outsider-trading 
theory has attracted a chorus of critics decrying its many alleged infirmities. Many of 
them have been wary of a significant expansion of insider trading based an 
amorphous concept of “deception,” and have instead argued that misappropriation 
theory can capture many of the most concerning hacker-trader conspiracies.
114
  
Others have lodged even stronger opposition to the concept of liability for outsiders 
under the antifraud provisions, arguing that the new theory opens an unwieldy and 
unnecessary Pandora ’s Box.115   Andrew Vollmer, for example, has argued that 
“[t]he government had the ability to charge one or more reasonable and appropriate 
crimes against the hacker and trader defendants but reached out too far to include 
securities fraud.”116  And, even sympathetic judicial opinions (such as Dorozhko) 
have held that computer hackers do not typically commit insider trading, and do so 
only if they employ deception in their hack and such deception ultimately gives rise 
to trading. When either is absent, a hacker’s actions are too far removed from the 
trading to be considered “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. 117   
Backing up to the broader perspective, the overall “fit” of securities fraud law 
to informed cyber-trading appears far from perfect. It is all but obvious that 
conventional insider trading models (classical and misappropriation) are ill-equipped 
to deal with cyber-traders.  By requiring a fiduciary-like relationship with either the 
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company or a third-party owner of MNPI, classical and misappropriation theory 
simply fall flat by focusing on factors that have questionable normative relevance 
here.  The emerging theory of “outsider trading”—to the extent it gains traction—is a 
somewhat better fit, but hardly a bespoken one.  On the one hand, the theory would 
seem to require some type of coordination between the hacker and the trader (i.e., the 
top row of Table 11), consistent with our normative analysis. Yet, by hinging an 
offence on an affirmative deception by the hacker, outsider-trading theory fails to 
capture an important subset of problematic informed cyber-trading, where the hacker 
/ trader team are “merely guileless thieves,” utilizing brazen (but not deceptive) 
means to access unauthorized information. Hence, even if outsider-trading theory 
gains jurisprudential traction (a long-shot proposition in its own right), securities law 
would remain substantially under-inclusive relative to the normative challenge at 
issue.
 118
 
Liability Under the CFAA 
If securities law stumbles in the task of addressing problematic normative 
issues surrounding informed cyber-trading, what might? The criminal indictment of 
the Dubuvoy Traders provides a possible clue, in a charge that many would find 
more esoteric: violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
119
 (CFAA). Although 
not within the regulatory remit of the SEC, the CFAA has both criminal and civil 
enforcement mechanisms that might, in theory, be better adapted tools for the 
normative task at hand. 
Originally promulgated in 1986 (and expanded through amendment several 
times since), the CFAA prohibits essentially three categories of conduct: (1) using 
unauthorized access to fraudulently acquire valuable information from a computer; 
(2) causing damage through the unauthorized transmission of computer passwords; 
and (3) causing unauthorized damage to computer data or causing damage to 
computer.
 120
 Although the liability provisions of the CFAA are quite general, they 
tend to concentrate actions whereby one accesses a “protected computer” either 
“without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”121 
The term “protected computer” refers not to the level of security protocols 
that protect the compromised data, but rather to the intended use of the compromised 
computer.  Under the Act, this definition includes any computer that is used (i) 
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by/for the federal government, (ii) by/for a financial institution, or (iii) in or affecting 
interstate commerce.
122
 These categories have been interpreted broadly: for example, 
courts have read the “interstate commerce” flag to be triggered by the use of any 
computer connected to the Internet—regardless of whether located inside or outside 
the United States—as affecting interstate commerce.123 
The elements of the CFAA that concern “authorization” tend to subdivide 
defendants into two groups. “Outsiders”—third parties with no affiliation with the 
target and enjoying no authorization to access the protected content; and 
“Insiders”—parties (such as employees, customers, and contractors) who, pursuant 
to some relationship with the target, have (or previously had) some limited 
authorization to access data, but transgressed that authorization on the date of the 
breach.  Interestingly, the Act tends to treat insiders who exceed their authorization 
with some degree of deference, requiring actual intent by the insider to damage the 
computer for liability to follow. Outsiders are subject to less accommodation, and 
may be found liable for intentional, reckless or other damage caused by their digital 
trespass.
124
 In recent years, moreover, some courts have been willing to “convert” 
insiders into outsiders—stripping them of their more protected status—when the 
insider breaches its duty of loyalty to the target (such as when the insider pursues 
interests antithetical to the interests of the target).
125
  
The CFAA insider/outsider distinction—particularly as augmented by the 
aforementioned fiduciary breach conversion—stands in stark contrast with insider 
trading doctrine under Rule 10b-5 (as discussed above
126
). There, the liability 
standard aggressively envelops insiders who breach a fiduciary duty to access data, 
while developing alligator arms vis-à-vis outsiders, even under the nascent “outsider 
trading” theory (which still hinges awkwardly on deception by the hacker).  Thus, at 
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least on this critical dimension, the CFAA seems to be a better “fit” for addressing 
informed cyber-trading. 
On the other hand, CFAA liability is far clunkier than securities law in 
engaging other facets of the policy challenge, such as the degree of coordination 
between the hacker and trader (the rows of Table 11). Recall that securities fraud 
exposure tends to “scale down” when the hacker and trader are completely 
independent from one another, since the deceptive hack is remote from and thus 
arguably not “in connection with” the purchase and sale of securities. This 
retrenchment seems normatively justified, since the lack of coordination 
substantially reduces the danger that cyber-trading activity subsidizes hacking and 
defensive activity. Under the CFAA, in contrast, the relevance of coordinated 
activity fades.  Although a trader who operates independent of the hacker can 
probably avoid CFAA liability, the hacker’s exposure appears not to change.  
A second area of misfit concerns the civil provisions of the CFAA, and in 
particular the measure of damages available to private parties.  Although the Act 
provides civil remedies (both injunctive and in damages) for persons injured by 
unauthorized access or computer fraud, the level of monetary damages available has 
historically been quite limited.  Under the Act, monetary relief is explicitly limited to 
economic damages.
127
 Moreover, most courts interpreting the statute have measured 
economic damages against the Act’s definition of a “loss,” which equates to “any 
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, 
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or 
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, 
or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”128 An 
obvious limitation to this provision is that the consequential damages (including 
stock price fall) associated with the breach must be related to an interruption of 
service.  In cases where a data breach simply results in the unauthorized access or 
downloading of data with no “service interruption,” such consequential losses may 
well be unavailable.
129
    In the absence of significant broadening of this 
interpretation, it seems unlikely that private parties will tend pursue civil CFAA 
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litigation vigorously against informed cyber-traders; most of the work will be left to 
criminal enforcement. 
This last observation raises a final shortcoming of CFAA liability: the 
relative absence of regulatory expertise for the DOJ to draw upon in pursuing CFAA 
claims against informed cyber-traders. As noted above,
130
 federal prosecutors have 
long enjoyed a secret weapon in their securities fraud prosecutions (including insider 
trading): a sophisticated and motivated regulator in the SEC, possessing an ample 
budget, years of expertise, and well-trained staff and attorneys capable of unpacking 
often dense and complicated transactions.  Indeed, the SEC and DOJ actively tout 
their cooperation and the latter’s reliance on the former’s expertise in many 
complicated fraud prosecutions. CFAA claims, in contrast, are outside of the SEC’s 
remit and do not come with a built-in regulator to assist with uncovering the key 
facts.   
Synopsis 
Given the discussion above, the battle of the bands between Rule 10b-5 and 
the CFAA as a legal theory for pursuing informed cyber-traders evidently yields no 
clear-cut victor.  On the one hand, the CFAA is far more flexible and less statutorily 
ossified than Rule 10b-5—where fiduciary-duty/deception requirements severely 
hamper and distort enforcement. That said, the CFAA appears less able to tailor itself 
to coordinated hacker-trader schemes; it has stingy civil damages provisions; and it 
has no built-in regulator to lend expertise to criminal prosecutors in investigating and 
pursuing claims.   
In short, both approaches fall short, and it appears that neither lends itself to 
an obvious and simple fix.  Certain forms of tinkering around the edges might be 
possible, of course.  Proponents of “outsider trading” theory, for example, may 
attempt to push for an even more capacious definition of deceptive—one that 
includes (say) willful and deliberate access to data that the hacker knows or has 
reason to know is unauthorized (“digital trespassing”).  Given the tenuous state of 
flux that outsider-trading theory finds itself in, however, this strategy carries obvious 
risks.  Alternatively, proponents of SCAA enforcement might push courts to expand 
their construction of consequential damages, granting private claimants greater 
license to recover economic losses (including those capitalized through lower equity 
prices). Here too, however, the statutory definitions in the SCAA (e.g., defining 
“loss”) make such a construction a heavy lift in the absence of statutory amendment. 
To the extent that one considers systematic statutory reform, it will also be 
necessary to remain mindful of the fact that information trading is a complex 
normative landscape.  Simply because there are idiosyncratic dangers associated with 
informed cyber-trading, it does not follow that all such trading is bad. As with any 
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other type of informed trading, cyber-trading can convey information through price, 
not only to market participants but also to the targets of hacking themselves.  Any 
substantive reform to either securities law or the CFAA must remain mindful of this 
tension.  One intriguing possibility—which we develop in a technical companion to 
this paper
131 —would broadly prohibit informed cyber-trading (along the CFAA 
model), but would simultaneously exempt initial arbitrage “allowance” (e.g., a 
monetary cap or a fraction of the firm’s economic heft) shielded from both criminal 
fines and civil recovery.  This allowance would serve as a type of “bounty” for 
bringing the information to light.  Once the exemption level is met, however, the 
trader would be required to adhere to a “disclose or abstain” duty, refraining from 
trading on the information until it has disclosed the information to the targeted issuer 
and the market. If the size of the exemption is calibrated reasonably, this alternative 
approach would have the benefits of (a) preserving price discovery (at least within 
the limits of the exemption); (b) preserving limited incentives to uncover information 
about vulnerability; and (c) catalyzing communication to the issuer about the nature 
of the vulnerability, so as to streamline both hacker’s offensive efforts and the 
issuer’s precautionary measures.  Although we see much to commend this 
prescriptive course from an economic policy perspective, we confess that it would be 
a difficult change to effect under current law (in the absence of a statutory reform).
132
 
Short of such systematic statutory reforms, however, perhaps the most 
expedient strategy would be to continue some version of the status quo, where the 
DOJ has nominal authority to bring enforcement actions under either 10b-5 or 
SCAA, but can enlist the SEC’s investigatory assistance to help develop and focus 
its claims.  No doubt some investigations will prove to come up dry in uncovering 
actionable securities fraud claims; but such cases will usually not announce 
themselves ex ante, effectively rationalizing the SEC’s coordinated involvement (at 
least early on). Where a securities fraud claim proves viable (such as in an “outsider 
trading” case involving hacker deception), the SEC and DOJ can continue to pursue 
a strategy much like today.  Where it does not, the SEC will have to back away, 
leaving the government to pursue a criminal SCAA claim should it choose, but with 
the benefit in hindsight of the SEC’s factual investigation to assist them. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered the phenomenon of informed cyber-
hacking, whereby market arbitrageurs learn of material, yet-to-be-disclosed 
cybersecurity breaches, executing trades in advance of the public disclosure.  We 
have demonstrated empirically that such practices appear manifest in the derivatives 
market trading, where breach-disclosing firms appear to have significantly larger 
open interest and trading volume in put options (relative to a variety of control 
groups) in advance of the disclosure.  Our results, moreover, are robust to a variety 
of alternative specifications and identification strategies.  We have also argued that 
such market activity raises certain idiosyncratic normative concerns, potentially 
justifying more capacious exposure to liability for hacker/traders in response to such 
concerns.  Under current law, however, it seems unlikely that such an expansion is 
possible without a substantial legal and statutory reform.  Recent endeavors to 
expand insider trading to outsiders (including hacker-traders) who use deception to 
breach a firm’s cybersecurity system may be warranted, though not a perfect fit for 
the policy concerns in play. Similarly, liability under the CFAA—while not requiring 
deception or fraud—still suffer from deficits in investigatory expertise, monetary 
damages provisions, and appropriate tailoring for securities market harms. In the 
short term, it will likely prove difficult to nudge doctrine in a way that does not run 
the risk of being severely over- or under-inclusive. In the absence of a more 
systematic reform (which could be years away at best), the current status quo 
(including a more developed and mature doctrine of outsider trading) may be the 
most expedient—even if flawed—response to informed cyber-trading. 
